Aiming to Establish Accountability, Public Interest, and Democratic Governance in AI
Participation of 41 civil society organizations nationwide covering human rights, labor, welfare, gender, environment, peace, etc.

On March 31, 2026, 41 civil society organizations nationwide—including those working on human rights, labor, welfare, women’s rights, environment, consumer rights, and peace—formed the “Civil Society Joint Action for Strengthening Accountability and Public Interest in AI” (hereinafter “AI Civil Action”) and held a launch press conference at the Areumdeuri Hall of People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy. AI Civil Action identified its main objectives as strengthening accountability and public interest in the development and use of AI, establishing democratic governance, and fostering a democratic public sphere. It also stated that it would mobilize collective capacity and solidarity to shift the current one-sided direction of government policy, which relaxes regulations on data and the environment in the name of AI development and use while neglecting the rights of affected people and communities.

At the national level, the government is rapidly promoting the AI industry and accelerating an AI transformation (AI AX) across all sectors of society. However, it is urgently necessary to shift government policy, which overlooks the reality that various problems are emerging or existing social issues are being exacerbated—such as job displacement and intensified labor conditions, infringements on the right to personal data, exploitation of the environment and resources, and bias and discrimination in training data. Civil society has long called on the government to establish a basic legal and policy framework for AI that guarantees human rights, safety, and democracy. It has proposed principles and directions for policies across different domains of AI and will continue to respond on a sector-by-sector basis. At the same time, however, there has been a growing demand for a collective civil society response that brings together the voices of citizens, workers, and communities affected by the rapid AI transformation occurring across diverse fields. Through the submission of a joint opinion on the National AI Action Plan on January 8, as well as multiple rounds of discussion and deliberation, civil society organizations have shared the experience and expertise accumulated in each sector. At the same time, they have agreed to establish common goals and directions for joint action and to pool their collective capacity and solidarity in order to shift the current direction of national policy—one that relaxes regulations on data and the environment in the name of AI development and use while neglecting the rights of affected people and communities.

AI Civil Action stated that, as preconditions for achieving trustworthy, safe, and controllable AI, there must be a shift from the current technology-centered AI policies to social policy; the guarantee of citizen participation as diverse stakeholders in decision-making processes; the protection of human dignity and human rights and a commitment to sustainability; the safeguarding of human rights and the right to informational self-determination across the entire lifecycle of AI—including development, training, deployment, and operation; the realization of gender equality throughout policy-making; and the assurance of sustainability in the context of environmental and climate crises. AI Civil Action declared that it would join forces and act in solidarity to ensure that these demands are reflected and implemented in policy processes.

At today’s launch press conference, moderated by Lee Jae-Keun, Co-Executive Director of AI Civil Action, the program began with a keynote presentation by Oh Byoung-il, Co-Executive Director, on “The Tasks and Roles of Civil Society in the Age of AI.” This was followed by remarks from Lee Mi-hyun, Deputy Secretary General of People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, and Choi Ho-woong, Chair of the Digital Information Committee of MINBYUN–Lawyers for a Democratic Society, addressing pressing issues such as “The U.S. Invasion of Iran and the Militarization of AI” and “The Crisis of Digital Rights in Light of Permitting the Use of Raw Data in Autonomous Vehicles.” Subsequently, there were explanations of the social problems caused by the expansion of AI across different sectors and the corresponding responses of civil society as followings:

– The Threat of a Second and Third Atlas to Labor Rights / Hong Ji-uk, Korean Confederation of Trade Unions(KCTU)

– The Problem of Gender Bias in Data and Algorithms, and the Deepening of Discrimination and Violence / Yang Yi-hyun-kyung, Korea Women’s Associations United(KWAU)

– The Establishment of Data Centers and the Intensification of the Climate Crisis / Lee Heon-seok, Energy Justice Action

– AI and the Weakening of Publicness in Welfare and Healthcare / Jeon Jin-han, Korean Federation of Medical Groups for Health Rights,

– AI and Changes in the Cultural Environment / Ha Jang-ho, Cultural Action

Participants pledged, in the name of AI Civil Action, to concentrate their efforts on achieving a just transition to an AI-driven society and ensuring that AI is safe and controllable.(end)

▣ Declaration on the Launch

Declaration on the Launch of the ‘Civil Society Joint Action for Strengthening Accountability and Public Interest in AI’

The advancement of AI does not necessarily mean an improvement in our lives!

As the Lee Jae-myung administration promotes the vision of becoming an “AI powerhouse,” it is fostering the AI industry at the national level and deploying AI across various sectors of society, rapidly advancing what is referred to as the AI transformation (AX). However, while AI development brings benefits, the ways in which it threatens our lives are also accelerating.

Despite the controversy surrounding the AI chatbot “Iruda” in 2020, discriminatory AI speakers toward women and persons with disabilities are still being used in school education. Meanwhile, unverified autonomous vehicles are being deployed on the streets, putting public safety at risk. Algorithms already shape the media public sphere and labor, influence financial services and social welfare benefits, and even enable automated administration and decision-making that replace human roles. In addition, AI weapons are being used in ongoing conflicts, and the militarization of AI is rapidly progressing.

What about the labor field? Companies are unilaterally announcing plans to deploy AI robots in production sites—citing efficiency and cost reduction—without prior consultation with workers, thereby threatening jobs. In workplaces such as call centers, where chatbots were introduced early on, the intensity of labor has instead increased to an incomparable degree.

AI also poses serious environmental and resource concerns throughout its entire lifecycle—from development and training to deployment and operation—including massive electricity consumption, a significant carbon footprint, depletion of water resources for data center cooling, and electronic waste generated during hardware production and disposal.

As such, we are facing a reality in which various problems are emerging or existing social issues are being exacerbated, including violations of personal data, bias and discrimination in training data, threats to the public sphere by algorithms, job displacement and intensified labor conditions, and the exploitation of the environment and resources.

We call for strengthening accountability and public interest in AI!

Nevertheless, national AI policy remains heavily skewed toward promotion and industrial development. The AI Basic Act, which came into effect on January 22, places its center of gravity on fostering the AI industry to such an extent that it is difficult to even regard it as a true “basic law,” while imposing only minimal responsibilities and obligations on AI companies and users. Likewise, the National AI Action Plan finalized by the National AI Strategy Committee on February 25 focuses primarily on technological advancement and growth, rather than on strengthening the public interest and accountability of AI, even as AI is increasingly functioning as a form of social infrastructure.

Before it is too late, there is an urgent need to shift the direction of government policy, which relaxes regulations on data and the environment in the name of AI development and use, while neglecting the rights of affected people and communities. AI policy must no longer be driven solely by technical experts and bureaucrats in a way that allows public decision-making—lacking democratic procedures and oversight—to determine the lives of citizens.

Civil society has long called on the government to establish AI laws and policies that guarantee human rights, safety, and democracy. It has also demanded stronger social accountability from AI companies. Civil society has presented principles and directions for policy across different sectors and will continue to respond on a sector-by-sector basis. At the same time, it will pursue joint action among civil society organizations to bring together the voices of citizens, workers, and communities affected by the rapid AI transformation across diverse fields.

Accordingly, we hereby launch the “Civil Society Joint Action for Strengthening Accountability and Public Interest in AI” and aim to pool our collective capacity and solidarity to shift the direction of one-sided government policies—those that relax regulations on data and the environment in the name of AI development and use while neglecting the rights of affected people and communities.

Citizens affected by AI policy must participate!

We have consistently pointed out the responsibilities of corporations and the government. However, this alone is not enough. We must more actively demand and build a shift toward social policies that secure the public interest of AI and guarantee human rights and democracy. The current reality—where AI policies led by technical experts and bureaucrats are treated as the national standard—must be corrected. Decision-making must reflect the voices of those affected, so that citizens’ lives are shaped through democratic procedures.

Therefore, the existing technology-centered AI policies must be transformed into social policies, and to this end, the participation of citizens as diverse stakeholders in decision-making processes must be guaranteed. AI policy must not serve corporations and capital, but instead meet the needs of citizens and workers while ensuring human dignity and human rights. Human rights and the right to informational self-determination must be guaranteed across the entire lifecycle of AI, including its development, training, deployment, and operation. Gender equality must be realized throughout policy-making, and sustainability must be ensured in the context of environmental and climate crises. These demands constitute the fundamental preconditions for achieving trustworthy, safe, and controllable AI.

Accordingly, we make the following demands of the government, corporations, and society at large:

Strengthen accountability and the public interest in the development and use of artificial intelligence!

Establish democratic governance in the formulation and implementation of AI-related policies!

Build a democratic public sphere on artificial intelligence!

We hereby call for a just transition to an AI-driven society, pledge to strengthen the capacity of civil society, and declare the launch of the “Civil Society Joint Action for Strengthening Accountability and Public Interest in AI,” committing to solidarity and collective action.

March 31, 2026.

All participating organizations of the ‘Civil Society Joint Action for Strengthening Accountability and Public Interest in AI’

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Civil Society Joint Action for Strengthening Accountability and Public Interest in AI

Participating Orgatnizations

• (사)김용균재단, Incorporated Association Kim Yong Kyun Foundation
• (사)서울여성노동자회, Seoul Women Workers Association
• 건강권실현을위한보건의료단체연합(건강권실현을위한행동하는간호사회, 건강사회를위한약사회, 건강사회를위한치과의사회, 노동건강연대,인도주의실천의사협의회, 참의료실현청년한의사회), Korean Federation of Medical Groups for Health Rights (Korean Nurses association for Health Rights, Korean Pharmacists for Democratic Society, Korean Dentists Association for Healthy Society, Solidarity for Worker’s Health, Association of Physicians for Humanism, Doctors of Korean Medicine for Health Rights)
• 국제앰네스티 한국지부, Amnesty International Korea
• 녹색연합, Green Korea United
• 대구참여연대, Daegu PSPD
• 디지털정의네트워크, Digital Justice Network
• 디케입법정책연구원, DIKE Institute for Legislative Policy Research
• 문화연대, Cultural Action
• 미디어기독연대, Media Christian Solidarity
• 민주사회를 위한 변호사모임, MINBYUN(Lawyers for a Democratic Society)
• 빈곤사회연대, Korean People’s Solidarity Against Poverty
• 사단법인 수원여성의전화, Suwon Women’s Hot-Line
• 사회적협동조합 빠띠, Parti Co-op
• 서울YMCA 시민중계실, Citizen’s Mediation Center Seoul YMCA
• 소비자시민모임, Consumers Korea
• 시민건강연구소, People’s Health Institute
• 에너지정의행동, Energy Justice Actions
• 울산시민연대, Ulsan people’s solidarity
• 의료민영화저지와 무상의료실현을 위한 운동본부, Headquarters of the Movement to Stop Healthcare Privatisation and Achieve Free Healthcare
• 인권운동네트워크 바람, Activists group for Human Rights ‘BARAM‘
• 인권운동사랑방, SARANGBANG Group for human rights
• 전국민주노동조합총연맹, Korean Confederation of Trade Unions(KCTU)
• 정보공유연대, IPLeft
• 정보인권연구소, Institute for Digital Rights
• 제주평화인권센터, Jeju Peace Humanrights Center
• 직장갑질119, Gabjil119
• 참여연대, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy(PSPD)
• 충북민주언론시민연합, Citizens’ Coalition for Democratic Media Chungbuk
• 캣츠랩, Cat’s Lab
• 투명사회를 위한 정보공개센터, The Center for Freedom of Information and Transparent Society
• 팔레스타인평화연대, BDS Korea
• 표현의 자유와 언론탄압 공동대책위원회, Joint Committee for Freedom of Expression and Against Media Repression
• 한국노동안전보건연구소, Korean Institute of Labor Safety and Health
• 한국노동조합총연맹, Federation of Korean Trade Unions
• 한국소비자단체협의회, Korea National Council of Consumer Organizations
• 한국소비자연맹, Consumers union of Korea
• 한국여성단체연합, Korea Women’s Associations United(KWAU)
• 한국여성민우회, WomenLink
• 한국여성소비자연합, Korean Women’s Federation for Consumer
• 환경운동연합, Korean Federation for Environmental Movement

Observing Organizations

• 녹색당 과학기술위원회, Science and Technology Committee of Green Party Korea

The use of AI in public spaces to track individuals’ faces and movements remains a serious violation of human rights

On February 26, the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional complaint filed against the Ministry of Justice’s AI Identification and Tracking System for Immigration Control. The case arose after media reports revealed that, between 2019 and 2021, the Ministry of Justice, the Incheon Immigration Office, and the Ministry of Science and ICT had promoted the “Artificial Intelligence (AI) Identification and Tracking System Development Project.” In the course of this project, personal information—including nationality, date of birth, gender, and facial photographs—amounting to 57.6 million records of Korean nationals and 120 million records of foreign nationals was provided to multiple private companies as training data for AI algorithms, triggering significant public controversy.

The petitioners in the constitutional complaint, consisting of both Korean nationals and foreign nationals, argued that transferring personal data—such as photographs collected and stored for immigration inspection purposes—as training data and allowing private companies to process it violated their fundamental rights, including the right to informational self-determination.

The Ministry of Justice and other relevant authorities failed to properly respond to the petitioners’ requests to access and verify whether their personal data had been processed by the system, as well as to the personal data dispute mediation process. They claimed that it was impossible to identify the petitioners within the massive dataset, or that they could not confirm whether the data had been processed because the system and the data had already been destroyed.

In a situation where the state had used, for purposes beyond the original intent, large volumes of personal data collected and stored for immigration inspection—providing them to private companies for algorithm development—while making it difficult even to confirm the resulting harm, the petitioners ultimately appealed to the Constitutional Court to determine the constitutionality of the practice. However, the Constitutional Court dismissed the case on formal grounds, turning away from what could amount to a large-scale human rights violation affecting the majority of both Korean nationals and foreign nationals who have experienced immigration procedures in the country.

The Constitutional Court held that there was no longer any interest in the protection of rights, reasoning that the project in question—under which facial data had been used as training data—had already been terminated following concerns raised by civil society, and that the facial data had also been destroyed. However, in order to hold the respondents accountable for their use of facial data until the project was terminated and the data were destroyed, it was necessary to confirm the unconstitutionality of their actions. Therefore, it is not reasonable to conclude that the interest in the protection of rights has ceased.

The Constitutional Court also assumed that the interest in the protection of rights had disappeared and then concluded that there was no interest in adjudication, stating that it was difficult to determine the risk of repetition. However, the very possibility that facial data may be used in such ways itself poses a risk to the right to informational self-determination. The risk of repetition therefore clearly exists, and it is difficult to accept the Court’s conclusion that there was no interest in adjudication.

The Consitutional Court also held that it is difficult to derive from the Constitution a duty to enact legislation prohibiting the use of personal data such as facial data. However, duties of legislative action may be derived from explicit provisions of the Constitution, the interpretation of relevant fundamental rights and statutes, and the state’s obligation to protect fundamental rights. Therefore, it should be recognized that the state has a duty—arising from the constitutionally guaranteed right to informational self-determination and from its legal obligations under international human rights treaties—to protect citizens’ right to informational self-determination through legislation regulating the use of facial data.

Such reasoning by the Constitutional Court can only be regarded as an inappropriate interpretation that narrowly construes the state’s constitutional responsibility to protect human rights in the age of artificial intelligence.

The Constitutional Court’s decision to dismiss the case is an irresponsible ruling that disregards the potential violations of fundamental rights arising from the processing of training data for AI, a data-driven technology. By leaving only the algorithm while destroying all of the data and records of its processing, the state acted in an opaque and unaccountable manner—yet this conduct has not even been subject to constitutional review.

The state processed vast amounts of data belonging to both Korean nationals and foreign nationals for AI training purposes, but instead of providing remedies for the resulting harm, it avoided even the most basic verification of the facts. This will likely remain a highly inappropriate precedent in terms of the principles of accountability and transparency in the age of artificial intelligence.

Despite the Constitutional Court’s disappointing decision, it remains clear that AI systems that track individuals’ faces and movements constitute a serious violation of human rights. In particular, identifying individuals through sensitive biometric information and tracking them in real time in public spaces such as airports can have a large-scale impact on the fundamental rights of many people, including the right to informational self-determination. Moreover, the very fact of being subject to continuous surveillance can restrict not only the general freedom of action but also the free exercise of fundamental rights such as the freedom of assembly.

Today, more than ever, AI is rapidly penetrating the everyday lives and labor of ordinary citizens. In this context, it is deeply regrettable that the Constitutional Court has squandered an opportunity to establish standards regarding the human rights implications of AI.

As an institution entrusted with the mission of protecting the freedom and rights of the people from unchecked state power, the Constitutional Court should have taken a more proactive approach and reached a substantive determination on human rights standards concerning AI training data. Given the real possibility that projects to advance AI using data held by public institutions could be pursued in the same or similar ways in the future, the need for constitutional clarification was urgent. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court has failed to fulfill its unique constitutional responsibility.

Civil society will continue to remain vigilant regarding the human rights risks posed by AI. In particular, if law enforcement agencies—including the police—use biometric technologies to identify and track individuals in real time in public spaces based on their faces or movements, we will continue to question and challenge the constitutional legitimacy of such practices.

AI systems that threaten the human rights of citizens cannot become our future. (End)

March 3, 2026

Digital Justice Network, Digital Information Committee of Lawyers for a Democratic Society, Institute for Digital Rights, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy

]]> 51487 https://digitaljustice.kr/51250/ Mon, 05 Jan 2026 12:58:20 +0000 https://digitaljustice.kr/wp/?p=51250 Download the Guide

“Some of our activists are drafting statements with ChatGPT, and I’m worried about what approach we should take.”

Many organizations are likely having similar concerns. With the emergence of various generative AI services—such as chatbots like ChatGPT and Gemini, and tools that create images, music, and videos—an increasing number of citizens are using them for both professional and personal purposes. Civil society activists are no exception. However, while they are being utilized, usually based on individual judgment even for work-related tasks, almost no organization currently has an organizational-level policy on generative AI.

There are many points that civil society organizations (CSOs) must consider when using generative AI. For example, if factual inaccuracies (hallucinations) from generative AI are included in an organization’s official documents, the organization’s credibility can be severely damaged. Security issues may arise if personal or confidential information is uploaded to unreliable commercial services. Furthermore, the output of generative AI might contain biases that conflict with the organization’s values. The process of drafting a statement using generative AI may exclude aspects crucial for activist capacity building and internal organizational deliberation. If activists use AI tools based on individual choice without an organizational policy, there is a high likelihood that issues beyond the organization’s control will emerge.

However, in the Korean context, there is a lack of guidelines available regarding whether it is appropriate for civil society organizations to utilize generative AI services, what principles and policies should govern their use if they choose to do so, and what guidance can be referenced from a human rights perspective. Moreover, the current status of which AI tools activists are using for which tasks has not been documented. This guide originates from the realization that we need to help civil society organizations and activists establish generative AI policies and properly utilize these tools when necessary.

To create this guide, we conducted a survey on which AI tools are actually being used for which tasks, how useful generative AI is perceived to be, and what problems users are experiencing. We gathered opinions not only from domestic activists but also from activists worldwide through the APC network. While the sample size is limited, restricting its statistical significance, we were able to confirm the real concerns and shared understanding of the issues felt by activists. Even those who use generative AI minimally responded, sharing their thoughts.

Furthermore, we held workshops with civil society and labor union activists focusing on generative AI. We shared the survey results and a preliminary policy framework, allowing participants to exchange their experiences and perspectives. Through this process, we reconfirmed that the act of honestly sharing feelings and concerns is crucial, rather than simply reaching a consensus. The policy framework presented in this guide is merely a starting point; the process of each organization creating its own policy that reflects its reality and the voices of its activists is paramount.

While some activists use generative AI with interest, many others still feel uncomfortable with generative AI itself. We clearly state that this guide is not intended to encourage the use of generative AI. The fact that the development of major generative AI models and the provision of services are exclusively controlled by Big Tech companies is also a concern. Although this guide focuses on the commercial generative AI services currently in dominant use, we deeply empathize with the need to overcome these structural limitations.

Despite various limitations, we hope this guide will be of some help to organizations and activists currently contemplating policies related to generative AI.

Recently, the Korean government and industry have been pushing strong industrial support policies with the goal of becoming an “AI powerhouse.”
In our daily lives as well, we are increasingly conversing with and relying on generative AI in both work and everyday activities.

However, there is something we must not forget when developing and using AI.
The source of the vast amounts of data used by AI, including generative AI, is ultimately people, and the subjects of its predictions and decisions are also people.
An even greater problem is that what AI learns from and reflects is the world as it exists today—a world that has long discriminated against and marginalized certain groups of people.

Our society—and AI itself—must protect human dignity and must not discriminate against people or violate human rights.
Yet as this mysterious and complex AI environment deepens, we may lose our way.
Can AI and human rights coexist? How can we find that path?
Will Korea AI Framework Act, which will come into force in January next year, be able to protect human rights?

The Institute for Digital Rights has published an issue report titled A Human Rights–Based Approach to AI that reflects these concerns.
There is nothing extraordinary in it. We have simply gathered cases and institutional examples that approach AI issues from a human rights perspective.
Amid the AI industrialization driven by states and corporations, we sought to examine the relationship between AI and human rights from the standpoint of people who are often hard to see—especially ordinary people who are affected by AI.

In truth, this is not a story unfamiliar to us.
It is that we cannot stop striving to secure the human rights responsibilities of AI and to protect people affected by the risks posed by AI.
At this moment, when everyone is running forward without even knowing where the future is headed, we believed it was important to reaffirm our principles.
If we are to hold expectations about the benefits that AI can bring to people, we must focus even more closely on its impacts on people.
This is the core objective of a human rights–based approach to AI.

We hope you will take a look at the report and join us in discussing how we can build a future in which AI and human rights coexist.

* This publication was produced with the support of the Heinrich Böll Foundation.

– Digital Rights, Education, Labor, Culture, Healthcare, and Consumer Groups Express Concerns

“Subordinate regulations that broadly exempt high-risk operators from responsibilities leave people’s safety and human rights exposed to AI-related risks”

1. On Monday, December 8, 2025, at 10:30 AM, 22 labor and civil society organizations held a press briefing at PSPD’s the Areumdri Hall in Seoul to criticize the problems in the government’s proposed Enforcement Decree and other subordinate regulations for the “Act on the Promotion of Artificial Intelligence Development and the Establishment of a Trust-Based Environment” (hereinafter, the ‘AI Framework Act’) and to call for policy alternatives from civil society. Digital rights, education, labor, culture, healthcare, and consumer groups unanimously pointed out that the subordinate regulations, which broadly exempt high-risk operators from their responsibilities, risk leaving affected people’s safety and human rights exposed to the dangers of AI.
2. The subordinate regulations for the AI Framework Act, which was promulgated on January 23, 2024, and is scheduled to take effect on January 22, 2026—namely, the draft Enforcement Decree, draft Notices, and draft Guidelines—were released on September 17. Among these, the draft enforcement decree underwent partial clause revisions on November 13 and is currently undergoing a legislative notice period to collect public comments until December 23. The AI Framework Act has faced criticism from civil society for several reasons: ▲ it contains no provisions prohibiting AI systems that influence a person’s subconscious or exploit vulnerabilities such as age or disability to induce certain behaviors; ▲ the scope of “high-impact AI operators” is narrowly defined; ▲ the obligations imposed on high-impact AI operators are insufficient, and even when violations occur, administrative fines are imposed only if the operator fails to comply with a corrective order from the Ministry of Science and ICT, raising doubts about the Act’s effectiveness; ▲ it includes no provisions on the rights or remedies of individuals affected by AI; and ▲ it broadly excludes AI used for national defense or national security purposes from the Act’s application. Given these limitations in the AI Framework Act’s provisions for preventing AI-related risks, the subordinate regulations must supplement measures to protect people’s safety and fundamental rights. However, the current drafts often fail to specify the concrete protective measures delegated by the law. Worse still, they add multiple grace periods concerning business operators’ responsibilities that are not stipulated in the Act itself.
3. Oh Byoung-il, president of the Digital Justice Network, pointed out that although the law delegated the authority to designate additional categories of high-impact AI to the enforcement decree, the draft decree contained no provisions on this matter. As a result, AI systems that pose risks to people’s safety and human rights—such as facial recognition in public spaces and emotion recognition in workplaces and schools—fall into regulatory blind spots. He particularly criticized the draft for classifying certain businesses deploying AI for operational purposes—such as hospitals, recruitment firms, and financial institutions—as mere ‘users’, thereby entirely exempting them from the responsibilities of “operators” (e.g., risk management, explainability, and human oversight). Businesses that actually deploy AI systems, such as news providers or video producers, were also classified as “users”, thereby being exempted from the obligation to label deepfake content. He argued that AI business operators deploying AI for business purposes and directly affecting individuals through their systems should bear appropriate responsibilities as “AI operators”.
4. Kim Ha-na, Chairperson of the Digital Information Committee of MINBYUN(Lawyers for a Democratic Society), pointed out that the draft enforcement decree failed to specify key responsibilities for high-impact AI operators, with many such matters appearing only as non-binding recommendations in public notices or guidelines. She emphasized that important matters delegated by law, and those directly affecting people’s rights and obligations, must be stipulated in the enforcement decree. Furthermore, she raised concerns that the draft enforcement decree, by exempting certain fact-finding investigations not authorized by law and allowing an unspecified extended grace period, may exceed its delegated authority. She further criticized this approach as prioritizing corporate interests over people’s safety and the protection of human rights, even in cases where AI products and services cause safety incidents or human rights violations.
5. Meanwhile, voices from various sectors raised concerns about problems found in the draft subordinate regulations. Kim Hyun-joo, the Director of Steady Call Center Branch of KPTU(Korean Public Service and Transport Workers’ Union), highlighted that contact center workers are already suffering serious harm from AI deployment, including layoffs, surveillance, responsibility gaps, and customer safety risks. She criticized the lack of legal mechanisms to protect call center workers and customers affected by AI, emphasizing the urgent need to establish such protections.
6. Following this, Choi Sun-jung, Director of Institute for True Education and Spokesperson of KTU(Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union), expressed concern that the government’s AI talent development policy subordinates education to industrial demands, weakening the rights of students and teachers and the public nature of education. He called for a policy shift towards cultivating critical AI citizens capable of addressing the ethical challenges posed by technology.
7. Furthermore, Ha Jang-ho, the Policy Committee Chair of Cultural Action, pointed out that government policies overly focused on promoting the AI industry have resulted in a serious lack of public discussion and policy responses to the severe threats to livelihood, labor rights violations, and the potential collapse of the social and cultural foundations in the cultural and artistic sectors.
8. Jeon Jin-han, the Policy Director of Korean Federation of Medical Groups for Health Rights, also expressed concern that insufficiently validated AI systems are being indiscriminately deployed in healthcare settings, leading to serious risks such as misdiagnoses, safety hazards, and unjustified medical billing. He criticized that, despite these dangers, the AI Framework Act fails to regulate such practices, effectively leaving the medical field as a regulation-free zone.
9. Finally, Jeong Ji-yeon, the Secretary General of Consumers union of Korea, expressed concern that the introduction of AI has caused consumers to experience inconvenience when forced to interact with chatbots and has infringed upon their right to human contact. She pointed out that when AI-related harm occurs, consumers are effectively left to bear the burden of proof. She stressed the urgent need for safeguards to protect socially vulnerable groups and institutionalize consumers’ right to participation.
10. As building a growth-oriented ‘AI powerhouse’ is the Lee Jae-myung administration’s top national priority, protecting the rights of those affected by AI-related risks is even more crucial. Korean Civil society has consistently emphasized that preparing for the dangers AI poses to people’s lives, safety, fundamental rights, and democracy is the state’s duty, while proposing policy alternatives. Following today’s(December 8th) press briefing, civil society submitted its initial opinion statement on the subordinate legislation for the AI Framework Act, including the draft enforcement decree, draft notices, and draft guidelines. Civil society opinion statements for specific sectors such as labor, education, culture and arts, healthcare, and consumers will continue to be submitted in the future. / End /

▣ Press Briefing Overview

• Title: “What Will Happen When the AI Framework Act Takes Effect in January 2026?” – Press Briefing on <Problems and Policy Alternatives in the Draft Enforcement Decree and Other Subordinate Regulations of the AI Framework Act>
• Date & Location: December 8, 2025, 10:30 AM / PSPD’s Areumduri Hall
• Co-hosted by: Digital Information Committee of MINBYUN, Digital Justice Network, Institute for Digital Rights, PSPD, KPTU, Headquarters of the Movement to Stop Healthcare Privatisation and Achieve Free Healthcare, Cultural Action, Media Christian Solidarity, The Democratic Legal Studies Association, Korean Federation of Medical Groups for Health Rights (Korean Nurses association for Health Rights, Korean Pharmacists for Democratic Society, Korean Dentists Association for Healthy Society, Solidarity for Worker’s Health, Association of Physicians for Humanism, Doctors of Korean Medicine for Health Rights), Civil Society Organizations in Korea, Citizen’s Mediation Center Seoul YMCA, Policy Committee of People’s Coalition for Media Reform, Human Rights Education ONDA, KTU, KMWU, KCTU, Solidarity for Child Rights Movement ‘Jieum’, Joint Committee for Freedom of Expression and Against Media Repression, Consumers Union of Korea, WomensLink, Korean Women’s Federation for Consumer (22 organizations listed above)
• Program
  • Moderator: Lee Ji-eun, Senior Staff Member, Public Interest Law Center, PSPD
  • Core Issues of the Subordinate Legislation draft (1): Oh Byoung-il, President, Digital Justice Network
  • Key Issues in the Draft Subordinate Legislation (2): Kim Ha-na, Chairperson, Digital Information Committee, MINBYUN
  • Sector-Specific Problems and Proposals in the Draft Subordinate Legislation
    • Labor: Kim Hyun-joo, Branch Director, Steady Call Center Branch, KPTU
    • Education: Choi Sun-jung, Director of Institute for True Education and Spokesperson of KTU
    • Culture and Arts: Ha Jang-ho, Policy Committee Chair, Cultural Action
    • Healthcare: Jeon Jin-han, Policy Director, Korean Federation of Medical Groups for Health Rights
    • Consumers: Jeong Ji-yeon, Secretary General, Consumers union of Korea

▣ Attachment (Korean)

Civil Society Opinion Statement on the Draft Enforcement Decree
Civil Society Opinion Statement on the Public Notice and Guidelines
Press Briefing Statement

“Personal information is not a public resource!”

– We oppose the proposed amendment allowing the use of original personal data beyond its intended purpose for AI development.

The government and the National Assembly are currently pushing for revisions to the Personal Information Protection Act, which would allow public institutions and companies to use personal information in its original form beyond its intended purpose without the consent of the data subject. This is because high-quality original data is essential for AI development, a key national priority for the Lee Jae-myung administration, which has prioritized Korea’s advancement into one of the top three AI-related sectors. The Personal Information Protection Commission and industry are united in pushing for the passage of these amendments, proposed by Democratic Party of Korea Representative Min Byung-duk and People Power Party Representative Koh Dong-jin. Our organizations strongly oppose these revisions to the Personal Information Protection Act, which would strip data subjects of their rights for the sake of AI industry development, and demand the withdrawal of Representatives Min Byung-duk and Koh Dong-jin’s amendments.

The so-called “AI Special Act,” proposed by Representative Min Byung-deok on January 31st and by Representative Koh Dong-jin on March 13th, both under the same title, “Processing of Personal Information for the Development of Artificial Intelligence Technology,” allows the use of personal information in its original form without the consent of the data subject (newly established Article 28-12). The essence of these two amendments is to unilaterally authorize the use of original personal information beyond its intended purpose for AI technology development, provided data controllers take technical, administrative, and physical measures under the supervision of the Personal Information Protection Commission. Furthermore, Representative Koh Dong-jin’s bill adds provisions aimed at reducing the authority of the Personal Information Protection Commission and alleviating the obligations of data controllers. This abruptly strips away the data subject’s right to self-determination of their personal information, which is the legislative intent of the Personal Information Protection Act. We feel a sense of betrayal that the Personal Information Protection Commission, which should be working to protect personal information, is instead spearheading the revision of the Personal Information Protection Act.

The incident of AI chatbot Iruda leaking personal information such as real name, address, and mobile phone number could happen again.

AI has become deeply embedded in our daily lives, transforming into diverse generative tools like chatbots, images, and videos, as well as self-driving cars and industrial robots. There are growing voices hoping that AI will bring positive changes to our lives and work, and the government is pursuing various policies to support the AI ​​industry. However, the source of the data utilized by AI is people. It is also people who are the subjects of predictions and decisions. Therefore, AI will inevitably have a significant impact on the jobs and rights of ordinary people. As we race toward becoming an “AI powerhouse,” we must consider the impact that AI and its data will have on people and society.

AI can learn on its own through data learning, make inferences based on this data, and generate output. However, trained AI models may contain personally identifiable information, run the risk of being memorized, and personal information contained in the training data may be leaked or exposed through prompt attacks. In other words, there is a real risk that personal information may be output as is during the AI ​​service stage, or that it may be misused for personal identification or sensitive information inference purposes. We have experienced the “Iruda Chatbot Incident,” where an AI chatbot trained on non-anonymized personal information leaked intimate personal information such as real names, phone numbers, and addresses, and engaged in discriminatory and hateful remarks.

The “right to self-determination of personal information” is recognized as a fundamental right under the Constitution, granting individuals the right to protect their personal information and control its processing. Under the current Personal Information Protection Act, which embodies this fundamental right, data controllers may only process legally collected personal information within the scope of the original collection purpose. Any use beyond that purpose, in principle, requires separate consent from the data subject. By way of exception, the special provisions regarding the processing of pseudonymized information allow for pseudonymized processing without the consent of the data subject only for purposes such as statistical compilation, scientific research, and public interest record keeping. In other words, currently, even if a data controller has lawfully collected personal information, it cannot use that information for AI training without the data subject’s consent.

However, Representative Min Byung-deok and Representative Koh Dong-jin’s bills, with the extremely abstract and comprehensive purpose of “developing AI technology and improving its performance,” allow public institutions and companies that process personal information to use original personal information without pseudonymization as AI learning data. This does not require the consent of the data subject; only deliberation and approval by the Personal Information Protection Commission are required. If the bills pass, the information I provide to receive specific services can be used as AI learning data without my consent. As a result, individuals would be compelled to accept the risks—without their intent or consent—that personal data may be memorized during the training process and that such memorized data may be leaked or disclosed.

Does the development and improvement of AI technology justify the use of personal information without consent?

Moreover, the bill doesn’t clearly specify whether data subjects can exercise their right to refuse or stop the use of their personal information as learning data. The original personal information that could be used and even sold in this way encompasses virtually all personal information generated and collected in our lives, workplaces, and online. Furthermore, if Representative Kim Tae-sun’s bill, which would allow the collection of personal information disclosed on social media services without the consent of the data subject, is passed, online personal information will indiscriminately be turned into AI learning materials.

The amendment to the Personal Information Protection Act proposed by Representatives Min Byung-deok, Koh Dong-jin, and Kim Tae-seon treats citizens’ personal information as if it were a public resource. Because it is a public resource, they argue, even the original data can be readily utilized for the national goal of AI development. They are broadly permitting the use of personal information in the name of industrial development, ignoring the numerous privacy infringements that AI technology has yet to overcome. If the Personal Information Protection Act is amended to allow such practices “for the development and performance improvement of AI technology,” a social atmosphere could emerge where the use of personal information is taken for granted whenever new technologies emerge.

Few countries in the world have laws explicitly permitting the use of original data without the consent of the data subject “for the development and performance improvement of AI.” This is because everyone agrees on the principle that protecting the fundamental human right to personal information is crucial even in the development and use of AI. What’s needed now is not legislation specifically addressing the use of personal information, but rather strengthening data subjects’ right to refuse the indiscriminate use of their information by the data industry and to control their own information.

If artificial intelligence brings us a beautiful future, that future must be created through a balance between technology and people. We have historically agreed that human rights must not be neglected in the pursuit of national development. Economic development unilaterally pursued by the state and corporations, disregarding human rights, is inevitably a regression of democracy. The revision of the Personal Information Protection Act, which unilaterally deprives data subjects of their constitutional rights on the grounds that government agencies are acting as deliberation agencies, must be withdrawn.

The government and the National Assembly must stop attempting to revise the Personal Information Protection Act to strip data subjects of their right to consent under the pretext of the AI ​​industry!

We oppose the bill that would allow the use of original data without anonymization, including shopping information, hospital records, communication information, and credit information!

We condemn the use of sensitive biometric information, such as face, voice, and movement, without the consent of the data subject!

Representatives Min Byeong-deok and Koh Dong-jin must withdraw the AI ​​Special Act, which abandons information subjects solely for the sake of the AI ​​industry!

2025. 12. 2.

Center for health and social change
Citizen’s Mediation Center Seoul YMCA
Civil society organizations in korea
Consumers union of Korea
Cultural Action
Daejeon People’s Solidarity Participatory
Digital Justice Network
Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU)
Headquarters of the Movement to Stop Healthcare Privatisation and Achieve Free Healthcare
Human Rights Education Center ‘Deul’
Human Rights Education Center ONDA
Ilsan Hospital Labor Union
Institute for Digital Rights
Jeju Solidarity for participatory
Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU)
Korean Federation of Medical Groups for Health Rights (Korean Nurses association for Health Rights, Korean Pharmacists for Democratic Society, Korean Dentists Association for Healthy Society, Solidarity for Worker’s Health, Association of Physicians for Humanism, Doctors of Korean Medicine for Health Rights)
Korean House for International Solidarity
Korean Metal Workers’ Union (KMWU)
Korean Pharmacists for Democratic Society
Korean Public Service and Transport Workers’ Union (KPTU)
Korean Teachers’ Union (KTU)
Korean Women’s Federation for Consumer
MINBYUN – Lawyers for a Democratic Society
National Health Insurance Workers’ Union
National Union of Mediaworkers
PeaceGround
People’s Coalition for Media Reform
People’s Health Movement Korea
People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)
Republic of Korea Human rights archive
Saebyeokjigi Center for Independent Living
Solidarity for Child Rights Movement ‘Jieum’
The Center for Freedom of Information and Transparent Society
The Democratic Legal Studies Association
Ulsan people‘s solidarity
WomenLink
(a total of 36 organizations, contact: idrsec@proton.me)

The Korean Progressive Network Jinbonet held an extraordinary general meeting on Friday, October 24, 2025, and decided to change its name to the “Digital Justice Network.” Please join us in celebrating the new beginning of the Digital Justice Network!

The Reason for the Name Change

Founded on November 14, 1998, under the banner of “Building an Independent Network for Social Movements,” Jinbonet has supported the informatization of progressive social movements for the past 27 years. To promote communication and solidarity among social movements, it has provided various internet services such as web hosting, mailing lists, online communities, and blogs. It has also operated ‘Socialfunch’, a platform designed to facilitate fundraising and support for social movements, and assisted labor unions in building their information systems.

However, with the widespread use of the internet, the role of supporting the informatization of social movements has gradually diminished. The ‘Cham Sae Sang Community (Bulletin Board)’ service has been discontinued, and the remaining services, such as webmail and blogs, are being maintained at a minimal level. While services like Socialfunch, which contribute to fundraising for social movements, will continue for the time being, we believe that Jinbonet has reached its limits as an independent network.

Meanwhile, the global monopoly of internet platforms has become increasingly entrenched. Based on the worldwide concentration of personal data, these platforms are expanding their monopolistic power into various offline services. With the advancement of new technologies such as big data and artificial intelligence, surveillance of individuals has become more sophisticated, and platform algorithms have reached a point where they threaten democracy itself.

Since its early days, Jinbonet has not only worked to build independent networks for social movements but has also advocated for digital rights, including freedom of expression and privacy protection. Today, our focus has shifted toward defending human rights and the public interest from the monopolies of Big Tech and the surveillance of power. In particular, as artificial intelligence develops rapidly, we are taking the lead in protecting the rights of “affected people,” ensuring that AI does not become a tool for discrimination or surveillance.

Over the past 27 years, Jinbonet has continuously strived to adapt to changes in technology and society. Today, we recognize that our organization has evolved—from one that operated an independent network for social movements to one that works for digital rights and social justice. In light of this transformation, we believe it is appropriate to change our organization’s name and mission to better reflect our renewed identity. By doing so, we can more clearly and effectively communicate our vision and activities to the public and engage with citizens in our shared pursuit of justice and rights in the digital age.

Why “Digital Justice Network”?

Digital justice represents not only our core area of activity—digital rights—but also a broader and more comprehensive vision. Digital rights extend beyond what is traditionally understood as “internet rights.” They encompass not only freedom of expression and privacy protection on the internet, but also the broader civic rights of individuals in an age where digital and AI technologies are applied to every aspect of life—from autonomous vehicles to interconnected devices. In this sense, digital rights have become the citizenship rights of the information society, and “digital justice” expresses our commitment to ensuring that technology serves fairness, equality, and human dignity in this digital era.

We also believe that threats to digital rights arise within the context of unjust social structures and unequal power relations. These include the logic of capital that prioritizes profit expansion over human rights and the public good, the state power that serves this logic, the growing global monopoly led by so-called Big Tech, and the expansion of surveillance capabilities by both the state and corporations to suppress resistance against the system.

In particular, the development of artificial intelligence has further deepened and strengthened these unequal power relations and surveillance capacities. Therefore, while our activities center on advocating for digital rights, we understand that this work must go hand in hand with transforming the very social structures and power dynamics that infringe upon those rights. We believe that the term “Digital Justice” best captures this vision — the pursuit of fairness, equality, and human dignity in the digital age, achieved through both the protection of rights and the transformation of the systems that threaten them.

The movement for digital justice is not something we can achieve alone. We seek solidarity not only with other civil society and human rights organizations that advocate for digital rights, but also more broadly with all groups and individuals striving to transform unjust social structures and unequal power relations. The word “Network” in our new name reflects this spirit of solidarity—expressed in a way that resonates with the digital nature of our work. It also carries the meaning of inheriting and continuing the legacy of the former Korean Progressive Network Jinbonet.

Please join us in celebrating the new beginning of the Digital Justice Network!

“The AI Framework Act must ensure the protection of citizens affected by AI risks through genuine and meaningful public consultation.”

The drafts of the subordinate legislation under the “Framework Act on the Promotion of Artificial Intelligence and the Establishment of a Trust-Based Environment” (hereinafter, the “AI Framework Act”), which will come into effect on January 22, 2025, were released on September 17. Since the AI Framework Act was first discussed in the 21st National Assembly, and continuing through its passage in the 22nd National Assembly ahead of its 2025 enforcement, we, civil society organizations have consistently called for the protection of citizens’ safety and human rights from the risks posed by artificial intelligence. On April 2, we also submitted a document titled “Civil Society’s Opinion on the Subordinate Legislation of the AI Framework Act”, outlining our views on the direction of the enforcement decree. However, the Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) has failed to engage in genuine consultation with civil society groups that have long emphasized the need for institutional safeguards to protect the safety and rights of citizens affected by AI risks. In light of this, and ahead of the September 26 consultations that MSIT will hold with various stakeholders — including industry representatives and civil society — on the draft enforcement decree of the AI Framework Act, we are hereby presenting our position.

The MSIT, the government body in charge, stated that it has been “widely collecting opinions from various sectors on the drafting of the AI Framework Act’s enforcement decree and related guidelines since April 11, 2025.” However, this consultation process has been heavily skewed toward industry interests, excluding civil society organizations that have consistently voiced their views throughout the legislative process of the AI Framework Act. Moreover, industry representatives have strongly submitted petitions calling for the postponement of the law’s implementation itself. Bae Kyung-hoon, the current Minister of Science and ICT and a former industry executive, also argued during his confirmation hearing that certain provisions — such as administrative fines — should be postponed or relaxed.

Under the Lee Jae-myung administration, the first meeting between civil society organizations and the MSIT took place on August 12. However, this was not a genuine consultation on the enforcement decree of the AI Framework Act. Rather, it was merely a meeting in which MSIT responded to inquiries and requests for a meeting with the minister ahead of his confirmation hearing. Subsequently, the document titled “Direction for the Subordinate Legislation of the AI Framework Act,” released by MSIT on September 8, did not include a single protective provision proposed by our organizations. While there were 20 consultation sessions with industry representatives, civil society was consulted only twice. Despite this, the document explicitly listed the names of civil society groups that participated in the meetings, creating the misleading impression that their input had been meaningfully considered. Such an approach raises serious doubts about the ministry’s intentions — suggesting that the so-called consultation was less about genuine engagement and more about securing procedural legitimacy by merely demonstrating that civil society had been “consulted.”

Meanwhile, the draft enforcement decree of the AI Framework Act released by MSIT on September 17 is deeply problematic in its overall content.

In South Korea, the risks that AI products and services pose to citizens’ safety and human rights have already become evident — including the spread of AI-generated deepfake sexual exploitation materials, the circulation of generative disinformation, controversies over AI-based textbooks, the unfairness of AI hiring systems, mass layoffs triggered by AI adoption, and delivery robot accidents. These risks are expected to grow even more severe in the future. In this context, the enforcement decree of the AI Framework Act must establish mechanisms that can at the very least safeguard citizens’ safety and fundamental rights.

In particular, for the AI Framework Act to function properly as a foundational law, it is essential that necessary risk mitigation measures be clearly stipulated within the Act itself and its subordinate legislation. This is because such provisions will enable future sector-specific regulations — for example, those governing the use of AI in recruitment — to operate in harmony with the overarching framework established by this law. If, however, the Act and its subordinate legislation include too many exemptions or carve-outs from regulation, there is a significant risk that future special laws addressing AI-related risks in specific domains will either conflict with the AI Framework Act or fail to function effectively alongside it.

However, the draft enforcement decree states that its legislative direction is to “focus more on promotion rather than regulation, establish only the minimum necessary regulations in a reasonable manner, and introduce a flexible regulatory framework” (Legislative Direction, p.3). This orientation not only contradicts global regulatory trends — such as the European Union’s adoption of comprehensive regulatory frameworks to address AI-related risks — but also seriously undermines both the stated purpose of the AI Framework Act (“to protect the rights, interests, and dignity of the people,” Article 1) and the legislative intent to strike a balance between “fostering the AI industry” and “building a foundation for safety and trust.”
Given the lack of meaningful consultation with civil society — including those who may be directly affected by AI-related harms — the industry-oriented outcome reflected in the current draft was hardly unexpected.

In particular, the current draft enforcement decree contains serious problems that must be revised and supplemented through subsequent rounds of public consultation.

First, unlike the European Union’s AI Act, South Korea’s AI Framework Act does not prohibit AI systems that pose significant risks of human rights violations — such as facial recognition in public spaces, systems that exploit vulnerabilities, or emotion recognition technologies used in workplaces and schools. Therefore, at the very least, the enforcement decree’s provisions on the definition of and responsibilities related to “high-impact AI” should include clear and comprehensive measures to address AI systems that endanger safety and human rights. Nevertheless, although the AI Framework Act explicitly delegates authority to further specify the list of high-impact AI systems through the enforcement decree, the current draft fails to include any additional categories or examples of such systems.

Second, the draft subordinate legislation narrowly interprets the term “user operator” beyond the scope of the law itself. As a result, businesses that use AI products or services in the course of their operations are treated merely as “users,” thereby exempting them from any legal obligations. This means that hospitals, recruitment agencies, financial institutions, and other entities that use AI for professional purposes are not required to fulfill responsibilities such as risk management, providing explanations, or ensuring human oversight for those affected — such as patients, job applicants, or loan applicants. Unlike end users that simply use AI products or services “as provided, without modification to their form or content,” businesses that use AI “for operational purposes” and thereby exert a direct impact on affected individuals — such as hospitals, recruitment agencies, and financial institutions — should bear appropriate responsibilities as “user operators.”

Third, while the AI Framework Act excludes AI developed for national defense or security purposes from its scope of application, no legislative efforts are currently underway to regulate such systems. This raises serious concerns about a regulatory vacuum regarding AI technologies that pose the most severe risks to human rights. Despite this, the draft enforcement decree broadly recognizes categories such as “AI developed or used solely for national defense or security purposes,” including those classified as core national security technologies. AI systems that can be used for dual-use purposes must not be exempted under the national defense or security exception.

Fourth, the draft enforcement decree sets an extremely narrow threshold for defining frontier AI — the category of advanced AI systems subject to safety obligations — by specifying that such systems are those with a total training compute of at least 10²⁶ operations. However, it is questionable how many AI systems currently in existence actually meet this threshold. Even if the criteria are adjusted in the future as technology evolves, the threshold should be set at 10²⁵ operations or higher from the outset to ensure that major frontier AI systems are covered under the regulatory framework.

Fifth, enforcement decrees, ministerial notifications, and guidelines each hold different legal statuses. In particular, with respect to the obligations of high-impact AI operators, the enforcement decree stipulates that such obligations “must be fulfilled” (Article 34, Paragraph 1 of the Act), whereas a ministerial notification merely states that operators “may be recommended to comply” (Article 34, Paragraph 2). When a measure is merely recommended — especially if it involves significant costs — it is unrealistic to expect businesses to comply, and it becomes difficult to impose sanctions for non-compliance. Nevertheless, in many cases, the draft enforcement decree fails to address important matters that should be explicitly stipulated, instead relegating them to ministerial notifications or guidelines. Crucially, matters delegated by the law or those that have a direct impact on citizens’ rights and obligations must be stipulated in the enforcement decree itself. Therefore, the key obligations of high-impact AI operators currently described in notifications and guidelines should be incorporated into the enforcement decree.

Sixth, the draft enforcement decree introduces exemptions from fact-finding investigations — despite the absence of any such delegation in the law — and allows for a lengthy (yet unspecified) grace period for enforcement. In effect, this means that even if safety incidents or human rights violations occur due to AI products or services, the state intends to forgo even the most basic administrative investigations or, in practice, refrain from imposing administrative fines (Legislative Direction, p.5). Given that businesses have repeatedly raised complaints about fact-finding investigations and administrative fines, these exemptions or postponements appear to reflect a prioritization of corporate concerns over citizen safety and human rights. Such a regulatory design, in its entirety, effectively signals — at a national policy level — that companies may introduce AI products or services to the market without fulfilling key obligations such as providing explanations, ensuring human oversight, or preparing and retaining documentation, even if those systems could harm consumers or other affected individuals.

We, the undersigned organizations, express our deep disappointment that the current draft of the subordinate legislation sacrifices the safety and human rights of citizens affected by AI risks in favor of promoting industrial development. In the remaining stages of drafting the enforcement decree, ministerial notifications, guidelines, and other subordinate legislation under the AI Framework Act, it is imperative that robust safeguards be introduced to protect citizens’ safety and fundamental rights.

September 25, 2025

MINBYUN – Lawyers for a Democratic Society (Digital Information Committee)
Institute for Digital Rights
Korean Progressive Network Jinbonet
People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)

– By Maja Romano(APC)

We are pleased to share that the Association for Progressive Communications (APC), of which we are a member, has published an article highlighting our recent legal victory in advancing Big Tech transparency in South Korea. The case addressed the lack of transparency in the privacy policies of domestic and international Big Tech companies and their failure to respond responsibly to data subjects’ requests. This victory underscores the importance of our ongoing efforts to hold Big Tech accountable and to protect digital rights. You can read the full article on the APC website here.

On 24 July 2014, APC member Korean Progressive Network Jinbonet initiated a lawsuit against Google following revelations about mass surveillance by the United States National Security Agency (NSA) alongside partners from the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, Amnesty International Korea and the Citizens’ Action Network. The lawsuit called for transparency regarding the potential sharing of users’ personal data with intelligence agencies, with Jinbonet and partners demanding access to records that would confirm whether their data had been disclosed without consent.

Although the case was complicated by US confidentiality laws, which prevented full disclosure regarding possible intelligence agency access, the Supreme Court of Korea made a landmark ruling on 13 April 2023 that Google could not deny user access to third-party disclosure records purely on the basis of foreign confidentiality laws. As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision, the case was remanded to the High Court for further proceedings. While the remand trial was ongoing at the High Court, Jinbonet and Google reached a settlement to conclude the lawsuit.

Under the terms of the agreement, Google must now provide Korean users with greater transparency about the handling of their data, including individualised responses to requests regarding third-party data disclosures and the creation of clearer, Korean-language privacy tools. These changes will significantly enhance users’ ability to access, understand and challenge the ways their personal data is used or shared. According to Byoung-il Oh, president of Jinbonet:

Many companies, including Google, allow users to access certain categories of their personal information online. However, this does not extend to providing access to all personal information held by the company. In particular, service usage records are an example of personal information that is generally not fully accessible online. For this reason, even where companies provide some degree of online access to personal information, it remains essential that users retain the ability to request access to the personal information they specifically seek.

This case holds wide relevance for digital rights defenders and civil society groups globally as it highlights the power of sustained, collective legal action to challenge tech giants and enforce users’ rights under national legal frameworks. It also reveals the tensions between domestic privacy protections and international legal constraints, particularly those rooted in US law.

Jinbonet’s role was central in sustaining this long legal struggle and pushing for reforms that address the growing influence of big tech on privacy and data governance. To recognise over a decade of the pursuit of justice, we connected with Byoung-il Oh of Jinbonet to discuss the impact of this case and its relevance to digital rights defenders who may be facing similar legal challenges.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Google has been asked to provide the plaintiffs with access to records indicating whether their personal data and service usage history were disclosed to third parties. What has it shared so far?

Google agreed, as part of the settlement, to provide the plaintiffs’ personal information and records of disclosure to third parties within a specified period, and has now fulfilled that undertaking. Most of the personal information was made accessible by directing the plaintiffs to Google’s Privacy Policy and to the relevant menus within their individual accounts, while certain categories of personal data were provided through downloadable links.

Furthermore, Google stated that it had not received any notice from US government authorities or other agencies indicating that the confidentiality obligations under US law concerning the plaintiffs’ personal information had been lifted. This means that, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs’ personal information was shared with US intelligence agencies, no notification of any release from confidentiality obligations had been received.

What would you highlight as major changes brought about by this recent agreement?

The Supreme Court rendered its decision in this case on 13 April 2023. Unlike the lower courts, the Supreme Court held that even if foreign laws impose a confidentiality obligation concerning the disclosure of personal information, such laws do not constitute an unconditional ground for refusing to comply with obligations under Korean law. Rather, the Court emphasised that it must be comprehensively considered whether the foreign law is compatible with the Constitution and statutes of the Republic of Korea, whether the need to respect such foreign law significantly outweighs the need to protect personal information, and whether the foreign law in fact imposes a substantive obligation of non-disclosure.

Furthermore, the Court made it clear that even where a confidentiality obligation under foreign law is recognised, a service provider must nonetheless notify the domestic user of the specific grounds for limitation or refusal by reference to the particular item requested. In addition, once the grounds for non-disclosure have ceased to exist, the provider must comply with the user’s request for disclosure of records concerning the provision of personal information. This holding carries significant meaning: whereas foreign enterprises had previously refused to comply with protective measures or users’ rights under Korean law by invoking foreign legislation, the Supreme Court clarified that Korean courts may substantively review obligations purportedly arising under foreign laws in order to safeguard the rights of users who receive services in Korea. The decision therefore represents an important precedent not only for the present case, but also for the broader protection of Korean users against transnational corporations.

Nevertheless, even after the Supreme Court’s judgement, Google continued to argue that, due to confidentiality obligations under US law, it could not confirm whether the plaintiffs’ personal information had been provided to US intelligence agencies. Under US law, if such a confidentiality obligation exists, even the fact of provision must remain undisclosed, making it difficult for Google to substantiate this point in Korean judicial proceedings. Moreover, where Google refrains from disclosing whether it is subject to such a confidentiality obligation, both the users (the plaintiffs) and the Korean courts face inherent limitations in uncovering the truth.

As a result, although it could not be confirmed whether the plaintiffs’ personal information had in fact been disclosed to US intelligence agencies (a negative aspect), the settlement with Google nevertheless served as a meaningful step toward enhancing the overall level of personal information protection for Korean users (a positive aspect).

Are there other concrete examples of the impacts of existing policy gaps regarding the obligations of big tech companies, and do you have plans to tackle these?

Beyond this litigation, we plan to continue addressing a wide range of issues caused by big tech companies. For example, earlier this year we filed a petition with the Personal Information Protection Commission against Meta and X for using users’ personal information for artificial intelligent (AI) training purposes without consent.

In addition, YouTube (operated by Google) blocked the channels of domestic civil society organisations and individuals without legitimate grounds. These channels included videos of citizens’ rallies protesting the imposition of martial law by a former president and calling for impeachment, raising suspicions that such videos formed the basis of the takedown. Even when appeals were filed, the channels were not restored.

Ultimately, it was only through indirect intervention via Google’s Global Human Rights Policy team that the channels were reinstated. We therefore intend to raise further concerns regarding YouTube’s unjustified restrictions on the rights of domestic users and the malfunctioning of its appeals process.

The spread of disinformation and hate speech through YouTube also constitutes a serious social problem. It was particularly shocking when the impeached former president was reported to have placed more trust in far-right YouTubers than in mainstream media. Yet the political establishment has sought to address this issue merely by strengthening criminal penalties for disinformation. Civil society organisations remain deeply concerned about the impact of big tech platforms such as YouTube on democracy, but think that harsher penalties for disinformation cannot serve as a true solution. On the contrary, there are serious concerns that such measures may be politically abused.

What in the Korean process can serve as inspiration for other countries or in the international debate on confidentiality and protection of users’ rights?

Particularly US-based big tech companies often invoke US law as a means of evading responsibility in other jurisdictions. However, when such companies conduct business in a given country, they are obliged to comply with that country’s laws and to respect the rights of its users accordingly.

That said, the case was not ultimately resolved through a final judgment on appeal but instead concluded by way of settlement. This reflected the continuing practical limitations in reaching and enforcing a definitive judicial determination, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision. More broadly, significant challenges remain in ensuring that global big tech companies comply with national laws and protect users’ rights.

Nevertheless, this litigation demonstrates that progress can be achieved. Just as Google’s Korean Privacy Policy was improved in line with practices under the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), it is necessary to continue efforts to make big tech’s business practices more transparent in each jurisdiction, and to expand practices most favourable to the protection of users’ rights.

Do you see these new policies having an impact beyond the court decision?

The settlement agreement not only requires Google to respond to the plaintiffs’ access requests (to the extent such responses are not precluded by confidentiality obligations under US law), but also obligates Google to implement changes to its privacy policies in order to enhance the overall level of personal information protection for Korean users.

1. Korean-language access request webform: Google shall provide a webform in Korean through which Korean users may submit personal information access requests. While such webforms were already available in Europe, Korean users had previously been required to submit such requests by email.

2. Explicit notice of US confidentiality limitations: Google shall expressly inform Korean users, through its Privacy Help Center page, that access to records of third-party disclosures of personal information may be restricted where US law imposes confidentiality obligations.

3. Individualised responses to disclosure requests: Where Korean users submit access requests concerning the provision of their personal information to government agencies, Google shall provide individualised responses regarding whether such disclosures occurred and whether the user was notified. In addition, where Korean users request confirmation of any release from confidentiality obligations under US law, Google shall provide individualized responses to such requests.

4. Enhanced supplementary information page: Google shall expand the supplementary information page for Korean users within its Privacy Policy to include more detailed explanations regarding the purposes of data processing and the categories of data processed for each purpose. While such a supplementary page previously existed, under the settlement Google has committed to provide substantially more detailed disclosures about its processing of personal information.

We have confirmed that Google has complied with these settlement obligations.

– Byoung-il Oh (Korean Progressive Network Jinbonet)

The 2025 IGF, the 20th annual meeting, was held in Lillestrøm, Norway, from June 23 to 27, 2025. Personally, it was my first time attending since the 2014 IGF in Istanbul—after a gap of 11 years. While the overall structure of the forum has remained largely the same, the formats of the sessions have become more diverse, and the duration of each session seems to have shortened to around an hour.

At this year’s IGF, I primarily attended sessions related to artificial intelligence. In recent years, AI has emerged as one of the most prominent global issues, and accordingly, many sessions at this IGF focused on matters concerning AI governance. By examining the key issues and perspectives raised in these sessions, we can gain a rough but meaningful understanding of the current state of AI governance.

Currently, the IGF website hosts the outcomes of the forum, including individual session reports, so further details on specific sessions can be found there. The DiploFoundation also used AI to compile and summarize key IGF issues, including the content of each session.
Therefore, rather than providing a detailed account of every session, this report focuses on the issues and perspectives that I personally found noteworthy.

Day 0 Event #261 Navigating Ethical Dilemmas in AI-Generated Content

In this session hosted by RNW Media, the focus was on the Haarlem Declaration, which outlines ethical principles and recommended actions for the use of AI technologies and tools in media and journalism. The declaration presents six core principles, along with illustrative examples:
– Ensuring transparency and explainability
– Promoting ethical data practices
– Safeguarding information integrity & content authenticity
– Minimizing bias, harm, and discrimination in use of AI tools
– Centring people over technology
– Balancing environmental impact of AI use
Given that Korean civil society, including JinboNet, has recently been exploring principles for the ethical use of AI technologies and tools, this declaration offers valuable reference points.

This session also featured specific case studies, one of the most compelling being the example presented by 7amleh, a Palestinian digital rights organization. 7amleh shared research findings on platform accountability during conflict situations and the development of localized AI models for managing Hebrew and Arabic content. They introduced a language model tool built on AI technologies, designed to monitor the spread of hate speech and violence on social media platforms in both Hebrew and Arabic, within the specific context of Palestine. After the workshop, I looked into their work further and found that they operate a platform that tracks and visualizes trends in hate speech on social media in real time. It raises interesting questions about the concrete technical approaches that nonprofit organizations can take to develop AI tools for public-interest purposes.

Open Forum #82 Catalyzing Equitable AI Impact: The Role of International Cooperation

This session, held as a preparatory event for the AI Impact Summit scheduled to take place in India in February 2026, explored ways to address AI inequality and promote equitable access for developing countries through international cooperation. Key barriers to fair access were identified, including lack of infrastructure such as connectivity, electricity, and GPUs; gaps in technical capacity and education; and limited availability of relevant datasets. To overcome these challenges, the session emphasized the importance of inclusive multilateral cooperation through organizations such as UNESCO, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the OECD’s Global Partnership on AI, and various UN initiatives.

A particularly resonant remark came from Sharad Sharma, founder of iSPIRT and a panelist at the session. He stated that we have failed to adequately address the harmful impacts of AI proliferation on social media. According to him, the current system has tended to empower states over citizens and businesses over consumers. He emphasized that we must not continue the practices that have led to these failures.

While I agree that international cooperation is essential to addressing AI inequality, the reality is that intense competition in AI development is unfolding across both corporations and nations globally. Moreover, there are significant challenges in establishing effective and enforceable norms for AI governance. In this context, it remains deeply unclear what realistic solutions might exist for overcoming AI inequality.

WS #219 Generative AI & LLMs in Content Moderation: Rights & Risks

This session focused on the human rights implications of using large language models (LLMs) for content moderation on social media platforms. Unlike high-resource languages such as English, languages with limited training data face a higher risk of human rights violations—particularly concerning freedom of expression, privacy, and protection against discrimination—when content moderation is driven by LLMs. Cases were shared such as Instagram erroneously labeling content related to Al-Aqsa Mosque as linked to terrorist organizations, and a Palestinian construction worker who was unjustly detained due to a mistranslation by Facebook—both of which are already known in Korea. A trade-off exists between accuracy and coverage in LLM-based moderation. For instance, following the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, Meta reportedly lowered the confidence threshold of its hate speech classifier for Arabic content from 85% to 25%, leading to the mass deletion of comments from Palestinian users. This suggests that platforms may manipulate algorithmic thresholds to avoid accountability, resulting in large-scale content suppression.
While technical solutions—such as incorporating input from local communities and accounting for low-resource languages in LLM development—can certainly be part of the response to these issues, I believe the more crucial factor is strengthening transparency and accountability on the part of the platforms themselves. As the Meta example illustrates, this is not merely a technical problem, but one that can be influenced by political decisions made by platform companies. In particular, the business models of these platforms can shape how content moderation algorithms are designed and deployed. In this regard, the risk assessments required of very large online platforms (VLOPs) under the EU Digital Markets Act deserve close attention. They may offer a potential mechanism for addressing these systemic problems by requiring platforms to evaluate the societal and human rights impacts of their systems.

Open Forum #75 Shaping Global AI Governance Through Multistakeholder Action

This session centered around the Joint Statement on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights 2025, issued by the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC) in June 2025. The FOC is an intergovernmental alliance committed to promoting human rights and online freedom, currently comprising 42 member governments. South Korea joined the coalition in 2023. However, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration has faced strong criticism for suppressing freedom of expression both online and offline, earning a reputation—especially among civil society groups—for its repressive stance on dissent.

The statement expresses concern that “(T)oday, AI systems are used systematically to suppress dissent, manipulate public discourse, amplify gender-based violence, enable unlawful and arbitrary digital surveillance, and reinforce inequalities and discrimination.” It declares a commitment to “strive for frameworks that are firmly rooted in and in compliance with international law, including international human rights law, developed responsibly through inclusive, multistakeholder processes and serve human needs and interests while respecting full enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

In this context, the statement welcomes global initiatives such as the UN General Assembly Resolution 78/265 on trustworthy AI, as well as the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law. The statement also underscores the role of private companies, asserting that “they bear meaningful responsibility to respect human rights, guided by frameworks such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and to identify, mitigate, and prevent adverse human rights impacts of their operations by integrating safety-by-design principles into both system design and governance models.” As of now, 25 countries have signed the statement—South Korea is not among them.

This session highlighted the need for human rights-based AI governance in response to threats posed by AI, including arbitrary government surveillance, disinformation, and bias and discrimination against marginalized groups. Key international governance mechanisms were discussed, such as the EU AI Act, the UN Global Digital Compact, and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention on AI. The session also addressed the responsibility of private companies across the entire AI lifecycle—from design and development to deployment and oversight.

These government efforts are certainly a welcome development. However, in other arenas, there remains a contrasting narrative—one that treats calls for safeguards to protect human rights from AI-related risks as regulatory obstacles to innovation, as if AI posed no real danger at all. For trustworthy AI governance to become a reality, this double standard must be abandoned, and both governments and corporations must fulfill their responsibilities.

WS #187 Bridging Internet & AI Governance: From Theory to Practice

This session explored how the core values of the internet could be applied to AI governance.
Discussions focused on the differences between the fundamental nature of the internet and that of AI, and how the values and lessons of internet governance might inform the development of governance frameworks for AI. The internet was built on principles of openness, decentralization, transparency, and interoperability. In contrast, contemporary AI systems—particularly large language models—are being developed in centralized and opaque ways, largely controlled by a handful of major corporations.

The question of how principles of internet governance could be applied to AI governance was initially intriguing—but as the discussion progressed, I found it increasingly confusing. While structural differences between the internet and AI were highlighted, I began to wonder: are these differences truly inherent? The values and principles of internet governance—such as openness, freedom, and respect for human rights—were not embedded in the technology itself from the start; rather, they were shaped by communities committed to those ideals. Although the open and decentralized nature of the internet is often credited with enabling freedom and innovation, we must also acknowledge that this very structure eventually gave rise to an environment dominated by a few monopolistic platforms. Similarly, while today’s AI systems are often centralized and opaque, there is nothing inherently necessary about that. AI does not have to be built this way.

Perhaps these kinds of questions arise because there is a growing demand to rethink the way AI systems are being developed and governed—currently in ways that are often unequal and opaque. Even if they have not always been upheld in practice, the principles of internet governance reflect values that communities have collectively agreed upon over time. Grounding AI governance in similarly shared and negotiated values would be both meaningful and necessary. In that spirit, this session also put forward several key proposals: enhancing transparency and explainability in AI systems; developing interoperability standards; ensuring that AI chatbots do not act as gatekeepers but instead preserve diversity of information sources; implementing regulations to address AI-related risks; and promoting the inclusion of the Global South through a multistakeholder approach.

Clearly, current AI governance remains vague, and in many respects, the ways in which AI systems are being developed and deployed diverge from the foundational principles of the internet. While the structural differences between the internet and AI must certainly be taken into account, the principles of internet governance can still offer valuable guidance in shaping more desirable and accountable AI governance frameworks.

WS #362 Incorporating human rights in AI Risk Management

Hosted by the Global Network Initiative (GNI), this session focused on strategies for integrating human rights into AI risk management practices. The GNI is a multistakeholder initiative that brings together academia, civil society, companies, and investors to promote accountability, shared learning, and collective advocacy at the intersection of technology and human rights. GNI has developed implementation guidelines for AI and human rights principles and participates in the OECD’s AI expert network. It is also involved in the B-Tech Project’s Generative AI Human Rights Due Diligence initiative, which aims to provide practical guidance for companies conducting human rights impact assessments of AI systems.

One particularly memorable moment from the session was when a panelist remarked, “we tend to think of ethical principles, wonderful, and we love them, but they’re very a la carte, whereas human rights frameworks and international human rights law has been agreed by everybody, and as a point of departure, it really is a very good place to start…” I found myself strongly agreeing with this point—especially given that in Korea, both government and industry often emphasize AI ethics over human rights. While it is certainly positive for organizations to develop and follow their own ethical principles, it becomes problematic when such principles are used as a justification to avoid meaningful AI regulation.

Another meaningful aspect of this session was the broad consensus around the need for mandatory human rights impact assessments (HRIAs) for high-risk AI systems. Participants expressed strong support for a risk-based regulatory approach, similar to that of the EU AI Act. During the open floor discussion, I shared that the National Human Rights Commission of Korea released an AI Human Rights Impact Assessment tool in 2024. I had been involved in both the development of this tool and in a pilot assessment earlier this year. Based on that experience, I emphasized that HRIAs are not merely checklists, but valuable processes that enhance communication among stakeholders and help mitigate risks by bringing together diverse perspectives. However, I also pointed out that the tool is not yet widely used—primarily because there is no legal obligation to conduct such assessments. Even Korea’s Basic AI Act only recommends, rather than mandates, the use of HRIAs. I argued that in order for HRIAs to be meaningfully implemented, they need to be made mandatory.

The session also raised an important point: a human rights-based approach alone may not be sufficient to capture the full range of AI’s societal impacts. While AI certainly affects individuals, its influence may be even more significant at the societal level—in areas such as education, employment, and social structures. Human rights impact assessments (HRIAs) may have limitations in fully addressing these broader effects. In my opinion, it may be necessary to distinguish between two types of assessments: one focused on the human rights impact of a specific AI system, and another focused on the broader societal impact of a particular class of AI technologies. For example, we might differentiate between an HRIA for a specific chatbot like ChatGPT, and a broader evaluation of the societal implications of AI chatbots as a whole.

Open Forum #27 Make Your AI Greener : a Workshop on Sustainable AI Solutions

This session, hosted by UNESCO, focused on identifying practical solutions for achieving sustainable AI. Given that discussions on the environmental sustainability of AI are still relatively limited in South Korea, I was particularly interested in this session. Several key proposals were put forward:
– Shifting from large, energy-intensive models to smaller, domain-specific ones
– Developing new performance metrics that account not only for accuracy but also environmental impact
– Encouraging open-source collaboration and data sharing to avoid duplicated efforts
– Ensuring transparency in reporting AI energy consumption to support informed decision-making
– Establishing comprehensive governance measures—including procurement policies, regulatory frameworks, education, international cooperation, and incentive structures—to promote the sustainable development and deployment of AI
A few days after this session, UNESCO released a report on resource-efficient generative AI.

Open Forum #79 Regulation of Autonomous Weapon Systems: Navigating the Legal and Ethical Imperative

Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) represent one of the most serious threats posed by artificial intelligence, yet public debate around the issue remains limited—largely because it is tied to national security concerns. One of the most critical and contentious issues in discussions around AWS is that of human control, and this session reflected clear differences in perspective among participants. Human rights organizations emphasized that allowing machines to autonomously make life-and-death decisions violates human dignity, and that responsibility must always rest with the human actors deploying the system. In contrast, industry representatives argued that military command and control have long operated on delegated autonomy, and that autonomous weapons should be viewed not as a revolution, but as an evolution. They also contended that risks associated with AI weapons could be managed through explainable AI and improvements in precision.

An industry panelist argued that while engaging in an AI arms race is deeply undesirable, it would be far worse to lose that race to authoritarian states. In response, the Chinese panelist objected to framing certain countries as inherently “good” or “bad,” and also opposed the tendency to group Russia and China together as a single bloc.

There was broad consensus on the urgent need for international efforts to regulate Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS). However, geopolitical tensions and the rapid pace of technological development continue to hinder meaningful progress in regulation. The Austrian ambassador underscored the urgency of the moment, stating, “This could be our generation’s Oppenheimer moment.”

It is essential that all stakeholders—including civil society—actively participate in these discussions and apply pressure for the establishment of international regulations on Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS). For reference, Jinbonet organized a workshop on military AI issues at the 2025 Korea Internet Governance Forum, held on July 3, 2025.

Open Forum #17 AI Regulation: Insights from Parliaments

This session featured updates and perspectives from various regional and national parliaments—including those in Europe, Egypt, Uruguay, Bahrain, and several African countries—on the current state of AI regulation and related challenges.

The European Union passed its AI Act in 2024 and has begun phased implementation. However, a surprising development is that discussions are reportedly underway within the EU about delaying enforcement. In particular, companies have raised concerns about not having sufficient time to adapt to the regulations concerning high-risk AI systems. This appears to be linked to the intensifying global race in AI development, especially in the context of growing regulatory competition among countries—exacerbated by the deregulatory stance of the second Trump administration.

In South Korea, the Basic AI Act was passed in December 2025 and is scheduled to take effect in January 2026. Despite being widely criticized as a weak, industry-friendly law with minimal regulatory substance, major industry players in Korea are still calling for a three-year postponement of its enforcement.

Multistakeholder Dialouge: Aspirations for the India AI Impact Summit

The AI Impact Summit is scheduled to take place in New Delhi, India, on February 19–20, 2026. It follows a series of previous global summits on AI: the AI Safety Summit held in Bletchley, UK, in November 2023; the AI Seoul Summit in May 2024; and the AI Action Summit in Paris in February 2025.

In parallel with the open forum titled “Catalyzing Equitable AI Impact: The Role of International Cooperation“, a stakeholder consultation meeting—though not an official session—was held on June 25 from 5:30 to 7:00 p.m. This meeting was organized to gather input from various stakeholders on key issues, the preparatory process, and potential outcomes for the upcoming AI Impact Summit.

Unlike previous AI summits, the Indian government has made a notable effort to engage stakeholders—including academia, civil society, industry, and the tech community—early in the planning stages. This inclusive approach is a welcome and positive development.